IT'S BEEN MOSTLY ABOUT MONEY! A MULTI-METHOD RESEARCH APPROACH TO THE SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST PARTY SYSTEMS
Although much has been written about the process of party system institutionalization (PSI) in different regions: e.g. Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) , Africa (Lindberg, 2007) , East Asia (Stockton, 2001) , Southern Europe (Morlino, 1998) or Eastern Europe (Bielasiak, 2002) , and its extreme significance for the consolidation and healthy quality of democracy (Mainwaring, 1999; Morlino, 1998) ; the reasons why some party systems institutionalize while others do not still remain a mystery.
Studies trying to discover the sources of such systemic institutionalization tend to adopt either a quantitative (e.g. Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005) or a qualitative character (e.g. Johnson, 2002; Meleshevich, 2007) and, consequently, face the following dilemma: either they identify a certain number of conditions affecting PSI in general (condition-centered designs), without specifying if they all apply to the different countries included in the analysis in the same manner, or they exclude from scratch certain conditions and focus on the causal chain connecting certain "preconceived" factors with the outcome in a limited number of cases (mechanismcentered designs).
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Seeking to resolve the above-cited quandary, and combining both types of research design (i.e. condition-/mechanism-centered), this article constitutes a first attempt to answer simultaneously all the following questions:
(1) what specific factors help party systems to institutionalize (or not)?; (2) what are the links (in terms of time and degree) as well as the causal mechanisms behind such relationships?; and (3) how do they affect a particular party system?
In order to answer all these questions, and using a multi-method research (MMR) approach, the current article focuses on the study of party system development and institutionalization in 13 post-communist democracies since 1990.
On the one hand, this will allow me to compare party systems within equivalent periods of time, avoiding inadequate comparisons with other established democracies which, as these are characterized by a higher degree of systemic stability, could lead to misleading conclusions (Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012:112) . On the other, I will be able to control not only for some external factors that may have influenced all countries in the region at one time (e.g. the Cold War, globalization, the world financial and economic crisis, etc.) but also for other conditions (see section 2) particularly specific to post-1989 Eastern European countries (Casal Bértoa, 2013:399) . In this context, post-communism functions as the scope condition under which the causal mechanism and set-theoretic relationships described in this article are considered to hold (Ragin, 2008:73) .
Methodologically, the article innovates in five respects. First of all, it continues the debate on the importance of MMR when trying to answer different research questions (Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Cooper and Glaesser, 2012; Beach and Rohlfing, in this special issue). Secondly, it complements the literature on how
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and process tracing (PT) could be linked (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013 ; also in this special issue). Thirdly, it constitutes the first attempt to date to use -following Rihoux and Ragin´s (2009) 
mandate -a Most
Similar Different Outcome/Most Different Same Outcome (MSDO/MDSO) procedure in order to reduce causal complexity before undertaking a crisp-set QCA (csQCA). Fourthly, it also shows the merits of combining both congruence and PT in the same comparative study. Finally, it also develops a novel "bipolar comparative method" (BCM) to explain the extent to which opposite outcomes are determined by reverse conditions and conflicting intervening causal forces.
With such an ambitious enterprise in mind the current work, adopting a "comprehensive" approach, reviews the literature on the determinants of systemic institutionalization in section 2. Before that, the paper starts with an analytical perspective on the concept and measurement of PSI, establishing to what degree party systems in post-communist Europe have institutionalized (section 1). Trying to reduce "causal complexity", the number of possible "key" factors is condensed to the minimum in section 3 with the use of MSDO/MDSO. Using both congruence and PT, section 4 looks at the "causal mechanisms" linking each of the relevant "explanatory" factors with party system (under-) institutionalization in two "typical" case studies.
Aware of the problem of "complex causation" (Ragin, 1987) , section 4 employs csQCA in order to identify how the different conditions combine to produce (or not) the outcome.
PSI: Conceptualization and Operationalization
Summarizing a discussion sketched out elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2015) , there is little agreement in the literature on how PSI should be defined. This is so because, with very few exceptions (e.g. Meleshevich, 2007) , most authors pay little attention to the notion itself and simply assume its multi-dimensional character. Still, and despite the on-going discussion on what are its main elements, most conceptualizations of the notion clearly refer to one dimension: namely, stability in the nature of inter-party competition (Lindberg, 2007) . For this reason, and bearing in mind that the core of a party system is to be found in the patterns of interaction among its subunits (i.e. political parties) […] , I
consider PSI to be the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time […] (Casal Bértoa, 2012:453) .
In order to assess the level of institutionalization in new post-communist party systems, and putting special emphasis on the stability of structure of inter-party competition for government, I will employ here Casal Bértoa and Mair´s framework.
In their own words, the structure of competition is [inchoate] , and hence the system is only weakly institutionalized, when there are (1) mainly partial alternations of governments; (2) the governing alternatives lack a stable composition; and (3) access to government is possible for almost all relevant parties.
Conversely, the structure of competition is [stable] and the party systems institutionalized if (1) there is largely total alternation or an absence of alternation; (2) the governing alternatives are stable and familiar; and (3) government is monopolised by a limited number of the competing parties (2012:88-89).
Following Casal Bértoa and Enyedi's (2014) sophisticated new operationalization of the abovementioned framework, which combines the percentage of "ministerial volatility" (alternation) with the percentage of ministers belonging to familiar combinations of parties (familiarity) as well as to "old" governing parties (access), I will be able to rank post-communist party systems according to their level of stability in the structure of competition or institutionalization.
2 Figure 1 . PSI in Post-communist Europe (1990 -2010 Note: The year of the "founding" elections is in brackets
An overview of the level of PSI between 1990 and 2010 in 13 Eastern
European democracies 3 is displayed in the figure above. The most evident conclusion derived from these summary data is that party systems in post-communist Europe have institutionalized at different rates and in different ways (Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012) . It is to explaining why this has been so that I will devote the rest of the paper.
Sources of PSI: a "Comprehensive" Approach
When looking at the current literature on the topic it is possible to identify up to seventeen different factors which, either alone or in combination, have been considered essential when trying to explain PSI (Casal Bértoa, 2012) . However, the quasi-natural experiment produced by the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc in 1989
followed by the birth of newly independent and centralized states in the Baltics, the Balkans as well as in former Czechoslovakia, allows me already at this early stage to exclude from the analysis two of them: namely, nature of state and time of transition.
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Moreover, and in a similar vein, years of authoritarianism can also be left out as it 3 All of the countries included in the current study are considered to be democratic (i.e. have a score of 2 or lower), according to the Freedom House political and civil liberties index in the period here examined. With just one year of democratic experience in 2010, Montenegro has been excluded from the analysis. 4 Democratized during the so-called "Third Wave", none of the post-communist states here analyzed adopted a federal structure. Party System Institutionalization perspective, it seems obvious that the variance in the outcome cannot be explained by constant conditions (Przeworksi and Teune, 1970) . For all these reasons, the following paragraphs will focus only on the remaining fourteen conditions, presenting each of them in turn.
Party institutionalization (PI). Few institutional developments have been considered
to be more critical for systemic institutionalization than the formation and development of institutionalized political parties (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Toole, 2000) .
Electoral disproportionality (EDISP) and party system concentration (PCON). While Sartori (1976) was the first scholar to link a party system´s "format" to its "mechanics", it was not until 1990 that Bartolini and Mair established a direct relationship between systemic stability and the type of electoral system employed.
Since then, however, various scholars have confirmed the importance both factors have for the institutionalization of party systems in new democracies (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Tavits, 2005) . Sartori (1976) , scholars have again and again maintained that ideological polarization fosters PSI, as the greater the ideological distance between the different parties in the system, the less likely that voters/elites will shift their allegiances (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Madrid, 2005) .
Ideological polarization (POLAR). Building on
Type of Regime (PARL). While in parliamentary regimes presidents tend to be elected either by compromise or by a qualified majority, presidential candidates in semipresidential regimes are usually obliged to forge broad coalitions cutting across ideological lines in order to attract as many segments of the population as possible.
The main implication is that, as a reward for their support in presidential elections, parties "can plausibly claim to represent the decisive electoral bloc in a close contest and may make demands accordingly" (Linz, 1990:58) . This will definitely have important implications for the stability of the structure of partisan competition at the time of government formation (Casal Bértoa, 2012 , 2015 .
Party Funding (PFUND). Although Huntington (1968) was the first scholar to point out that political parties can develop rules in order to protect the integrity of the 5 It seems rather obvious that newly democratized countries (e.g. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.) display longer authoritarian spans that those which experienced democracy at some point in the past (e.g. Estonia, Czech Republic or Slovakia).
political process from outsiders challenging the status quo ante, it was only with Katz and Mair´s (1995) "cartelization thesis" that scholars started to examine the positive link between public subsidies and PSI (Birnir, 2005; Spirova, 2007) . Lipset and Rokkan´s (1967) classical "hypothesis", party systems freeze because "individuals develop attachments to parties on the basis of their social locations -their religion, class, residence (urban or rural) and culture (core versus minority culture)" (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007:163; Madrid, 2005 Political Culture (PCUL). Ever since Mainwaring an "anti-organizational" political culture has been considered to be an obstacle, although not necessarily a permanent one, to PSI (1999:233-234; Johnson, 2002:720-728) .
Ethno-religious Concentration (ERCON). According to

Historical legacies (LEGAC).
According to Kitschelt (1995) , In a few words, the main argument holds that the earlier the economic industrialization, state formation and democratization before communism, as well as the milder the type of communist rule, the more institutionalized the structure of interparty competition will be.
Economic development (WEALTH). The level of economic development has long been seen to shape the process of PSI in new democracies, whether in Latin America (Madrid, 2005; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999) , Eastern Europe (Tavits, 2005) or East Asia (Johnson, 2002) , as under conditions of economic hardship voters will move away from incumbents trying to find new political alternatives, either in the traditional opposition or at the fringes of the political spectrum (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Tucker, 2006) .
Previous democracy (PDEM)
. Scholars have traditionally maintained that a higher level of PSI will take place in those countries with previous democratic experiences than in those nations where party competition is a new phenomenon (Kitschelt, 1995; Remmer, 1985) .
Democratic experience (YoD). According to most scholars PSI is a lengthy process in which stable patterns of partisan competition will only emerge after democratic government has been in place for some time (Spirova, 2007: 161-162; Tavits, 2005: 296) .
EU conditionality (EUCON). According to Vachudová (2008) , EU integration fostered PSI by shifting the main dimension of partisan competition from culture to economy. For others, however, "EU has been a contributing factor in the inability of CEE party systems […] to acquire the attributes of an institutionalized party system" (Ladrech, 2011: 219) .
Relevant Factors (What?): MSDO/MDSO
As we have already seen, comparative political theory offers different possible (co-)explanations for the distinct levels of PSI observed in new and old democracies.
In this article, where the number of possible combinations of conditions (2 14 =16,384)
clearly dwarfs the number of cases available for analysis (13), I will make use of De Meur and Berg-Schlosser´s (1994) MSDO/MDSO procedure, a technique particularly well suited as a prior step before using csQCA and, on the whole, extremely useful for systemic analyses which, like this one, present the so-called "limited diversity"
problem. 6 It is in the name of parsimony and in order to avoid a simple description of cases -with one individual explanation per case -that a solution to this problem needs to be found before proceeding with any QCA-type analysis (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:27) .
The idea is, thereby, that by carefully matching all the cases (i.e. party systems) under study across the different (potential) explanatory factors 7 found in the institutionalization literature, using a step-wise elaboration of distance matrices and 6 Limited diversity occurs when no real cases matching all logically possible combinations of the selected conditions can be found (Grofman and Schneider, 2009:3) . 7 Throughout the text both terms "explanatory factors" and " conditions" are used synonymously.
dis-/similarity graphs (see online Appendix), 8 I can identify the most similar pairs of cases with a different outcome as well as the most different pairs of cases displaying a similar outcome (Rihoux, 2006:688) . This will allow me to reduce the number of conditions to the minimum and, therefore, to be able to achieve a less complex comparison which, without any preconceived ideas, focuses on those relevant factors that might account for the different degrees of systemic institutionalization observed (De Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009:215) .
Bearing in mind that we have fourteen possible explanatory factors, and following the logic of the MDSO/MSDO procedure (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 1994; De Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009; De Meur et al., 2006) , I have first clustered the different conditions into three rather homogeneous categories: namely, socioeconomic (A), historic-structural (B), and systemic-institutional (C). 9 Secondly, and because the criteria used to calculate the distance between (two) factors are based on Boolean algebra, all conditions need to be dichotomized (De Meur et al., 2006:69) .
This is done according to the criteria established in Table A1 , 10 which displays not only the threshold for the dichotomization of both the conditions and the outcome, but also the sources according to which such thresholds are established. The result is a data matrix (Table A2) Once these operations have taken place, and before proceeding with any further comparison, it is essential to identify which pairs of cases are the most similar and which the most dissimilar. For that it is necessary to build and synthesise distance matrices within and across categories (De Meur et al., 2006:75) , as cases can be similar in one category (e.g. socio-economic) but dissimilar for another (e.g. All in all, it is only after reducing the number of possible explanatory factors by more than three quarters that a methodologically manageable, and certainly less complex, analysis of the "causal link/s" between those four conditions and the outcome (and/or the lack of it) can be undertaken.
systemic-institutional
Causal Mechanisms (Why?): Congruence and PT
In order to know how the previously mentioned relevant factors affect the process of PSI, I will make use in this section of two well-known case-study methods.
The first one, the so-called "congruence method", will help me to understand to what extent variance in the level of PSI can be explained by variance in each of the abovecited conditions. This will be done by testing both the direction and degree of change in both the outcome and the various conditions at different points in time during the process of PSI (George and Bennett, 2005:181-204, 486) . In particular, the abovecited method is particularly suitable for analysing phenomena which -like PSI itselfrefer to processes which not only involve specific periodizations (e.g. elections, governmental changes, etc.), but are neither monotonic, unidirectional or finite. It is in such cases that the congruence method reveals itself to be particularly useful, allowing not only for the analysis of PSI at the end of the process, but also at any particular point in time during it.
The second (PT) will allow me not only to see if there really is a common causal mechanism 19 linking the conditions and outcome, but also to specifically but also to capture the "causal mechanism" behind processes which, even if facing each other, do not necessarily mirror each other. In particular, the idea is that by choosing two cases which, sharing most of the conditions, totally diverge in both the "relevant" conditions and the outcomes, I will be able to "direct [my] attention to the ways in which they differ (Gerring, 2007:133-135 )" (Tarrow, 2010:234) , examining in particular how such opposite "causal forces" actually work.
Going back to the cases and looking again at the MSDO/MDSO results (table   A11 ) it follows that two of the most similar party systems with totally opposite levels of institutionalization are Hungary (positive) and Lithuania (negative).
22
The fact that economic development is one of the most important determinants of PSI in post-communist Europe does not come as a surprise. Indeed, when we look at the state of the economy as well as the degree of systemic institutionalization in both Hungary (figure 2) and Lithuania (figure 3) at the end of each electoral period we can observe a rather clear (positive and negative, respectively) relationship. Thus, while the state of the economy in Lithuania -on every single indicator -has never been as good as in Hungary, the degree of PSI in the latter has always been superior.
In this context, it should be borne in mind that while Hungary had already started a process of (limited) economic liberalization in the second half of the 1960s, system has suffered a chronic process of de-institutionalization since the late 1990s (Ramonaitė, 2006) .
As follows from the MSDO/MDSO analysis above, parliamentary fragmentation also needs to be considered as one of PSI´s most important determinants. The logic is that, as thoroughly explained elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2012 , 2015 , by indicating the numbers (and strength) of "streams of interaction", the number (and size) of parties winning seats in legislative elections clearly determines the likely tactics of partisan competition and opposition as well as government formation possibilities in a country. Moreover, because the number of parties has "mechanical predispositions" in the sense that it gives us information on certain functional properties (e.g. interaction streams, coalition potential, etc.), the relationship between party system format and institutionalization can be said to be "path-dependence" as it responds to the following pattern: "the greater the number of parties (that have a say), the greater the complexity and probably the intricacy of the [interactions will be]" (Sartori, 1976:120, 173) . In other words, when party leaders must follow manoeuvres among a large number of parties, predictability and stability in the structure of inter-party competition is obviously hindered.
Figures 2 and 3 above, which display the scores of both parliamentary fragmentation and PSI at the end of each electoral period in Hungary and Lithuania (respectively), show the almost perfect relationship between the above-cited two conditions. Hence, while in the institutionalized Hungarian party system the "effective" number of legislative parties -constantly below four -has decreased over time (from 3.8 to 2.4), the Lithuanian party system has suffered from a continuous and parallel process of fragmentation (from 3 to 5.8) and de-institutionalization.
Moreover, and apart from this pronounced inter-country variation, another striking pattern revealed by these data is one that is also intuitively plausible: within each country parliamentary fragmentation and PSI rise and fall in accord, so when the former decreases the latter increases and vice versa. In other words, and confirming previous expectations, they fluctuate not only in the same direction but also to a similar extent.
Similarly, party funding has also contributed to the institutionalization of postcommunist party systems as it has eased the continuity of existing political options while, at the same time, reducing "the impact of those seeking to challenge the political status quo" (Scarrow, 2006:629) . In other words, by discouraging the entry of new parties to the system and, therefore, keeping the number of (both electoral and parliamentary) parties rather low, publicly funded party systems have been able to guarantee the supremacy of already existing parties (Katz and Mair, 1995:15) and, consequently, assure the stability and predictability of the structure of competition among them. In order to test the above-mentioned statements, table 2 compares the two party systems at hand on the basis of the number of parties winning at least 0.5 per cent of the vote as well as the share of parties winning less than 5 per cent of the vote (Scarrow, 2006) . No matter at which indicator we look, it seems clear that "the model of Hungarian party funding [has…] help[ed…] to consolidate the party system" (Enyedi, 2007: 102) . The argument that this is the case derives also from the fact that, as displayed above, both indicators clearly improved after the introduction of public subsidies for Lithuanian political parties in 1999, although not to the same levels as its Hungarian counterpart (see also figure 3 ).
In a similar vein, while the Hungarian model of public funding introduced from the very beginning a clear discrimination between publicly and non-publicly funded parties, guaranteeing the concentration of the party system among a reduced number of political options; in Lithuania such a "reductive" effect only started to take place after 1999, when a 3 per cent "payout threshold" was introduced. In fact, and as follows from the last column in Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2013:19-20, 37) .
But together with a country´s economy and institutions, sociological factors have also played an important role in the process of PSI.
The idea is that when cleavages are cross-cutting, parties will have difficulties in finding ideologically contiguous partners with which to cooperate, as being close in one dimension may be accompanied by irreconcilable differences in another. On the contrary, when cleavages are cumulative (i.e. coinciding), parties will tend to interact only with other parties within the same side of the cleavage, rejecting any cooperation that would lead them to cross such a line ).
This will definitely simplify the structure of inter-party competition into two different and separate blocs, making it more stable and predictable over time. Looking at the previous "congruent" analysis, it seems clear that there is an almost perfect -in time and degree -relationship between each of the abovementioned explanatory factors and PSI. Unfortunately, it does not tell us anything about the causal mechanism linking the former with the latter. For that a more indepth PT analysis "detailing each of the parts of the mechanism between X [here causal factors] and the outcome, focusing on how they transmit causal forces" is needed (Beach, in this special issue).
Interestingly enough, and implicit in previous literature (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Birnir, 2005; Casal Bértoa, 2012; Tucker, 2006) , there seems to be a common causal mechanism linking, positively or negatively, each of the above-mentioned factors with the process of systemic institutionalization. Figure 5 displays a tentative formalization of the mechanism, with the top illustrating the parts and the bottom the observable implications.
As can be observed above, the first part of the mechanism refers to the triggers: namely, the presence of economic development, party concentration, a cumulative cleavage structure and/or public subsidies to political parties. At this moment, we should expect to find evidences of high GDP growth and/or low inflation/unemployment rates, a moderately low number of parties in parliament, low levels of cleavage cross-cuttingness in society and a rather high level of political parties financially dependent on the State.
The second part shows that the electorate, in light of the above-mentioned favourable conditions, will remain stable in their partisan preferences. We should then expect to find relatively low levels of change in the balance of power among parties:
that is, they should be able to attract a rather similar percentage of votes again and again. This would help them not only to strength the levels of partisanship (i.e.
identification, closeness, membership) in society, but to routinize predictable patterns of (coalitional/cooperative) behaviour among them.
For the third part of the mechanism, we should see that the partisan status quo remains almost unaltered election after election. The observable implications here may consist of few parties coming or going within the electoral spectrum. As a result, and at the end of the mechanism, we should detect a relevant degree of systemic turnover. In this context, we should expect to observe quite high levels of partisan continuity at the parliamentary level.
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Lastly, the outcome should be PSI. In practical terms, we should then observe at the time of government formation stable patterns of competition among all political parties in the system, in terms of alternation, formula and access. Note here however that if the contrary is true for every single part of the mechanism displayed above, then a similar but opposite process leading to weak levels of PSI would be observed. practice, we will make use again of the typical (positive and negative, respectively) cases of Hungary and Lithuania. This will allow me to avoid the analysis of part one, already explained in depth above: both synchronically and diachronically. Regarding part three, the most straightforward way of looking at the degree of change in the balance of electoral power among political parties is to look at the Pedersen´s index of electoral volatility for both countries in the period here examined. While on average Hungarian voters´ volatility barely passes 23 per cent, and is therefore one of the most "stable" within the post-communist region, the Lithuanian electorate -with barely 40 per cent -is considered to be the most unstable in the whole European continent (Casal Bértoa, 2013:417) Part four refers to the continuity (or not) of the main political options in the party system. The best way to test this fragment of the causal chain displayed above is to look at the number of parties entering and leaving the party system at each election.
Using Toole´s "party system turnover" (PST) index ( Regarding the outcome, was there a stabilization/destabilization in the structure of competition for government? As illustrated in Casal Bértoa and Mair (2012: 95, 98, 103) , and explained elsewhere (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011:123-129) , the patterns of inter-party collaboration/cooperation in Hungary have been rather stable, especially since 1994 when a tri-polar structure of partisan competition gave way to a bipolar one, pitting the parties on the left (MSZP and SZDSZ) against the parties on the right (Fidesz plus other minor conservative parties). On the contrary, "the Lithuanian party system appears to be in a state of flux", especially after the parliamentary elections of 2000, a real "turning point in [its] development" (Ramonaitė, 2006:71, 84) . Indeed, it was at this time when the two-bloc confrontation (i.e. socialist vs. conservatives) was disturbed by the emergence -first with the liberals, later with the populists -of a tripolar structure of competition.
All in all, the previous findings confirm that PSI is far from being a "unidirectional or irreversible" phenomenon (Stockton, 2001:95) . In fact, and notwithstanding the specific status of a party system at a certain point in time, what clearly follows from the "congruence" analysis undertaken above is that variance in one or more of the conditions can modulate the degree of PSI over time. This is not to deny that, as follows from the PT analysis, there are also a number of specific forcescommon to all conditions -which bounded together clearly affect the mode in which those conditions determine the degree and direction of PSI as a whole.
Causal Combinations (How?): csQCA
Now that we know the intervening causal process by which socio-economic and institutional conditions are linked to PSI (or its absence), and bearing in mind that not all of them are present (or absent) in all party systems, I will try to discover how such conditions have combined in each of the post-communist countries here analysed. For that csQCA -a methodological technique dealing with a limited number of cases in a "configurational" way -constitutes the perfect tool (Beach and Rohlfing in this special issue; Ragin, 1987) .
According to the "Standards of Good Practice in QCA" (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010) , the analysis of necessary and of sufficient conditions, with the former always going first, needs to be separate for the outcome and for its nonoccurrence.
Conditions for PSI
In terms of necessity, the analysis (table A13) reveals that none of the four conditions, either in its presence or its logical negation, reaches the consistency threshold of 0.9 recommended in the literature (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013) . However PFUND with a consistency threshold of 0.86 comes close, anticipating the importance such a condition has for the explanation of PSI (see below).
In order to perform the analysis of sufficiency it is essential to elaborate a truth table based on the four conditions. As the "contradictions-free" truth table (table   A14) shows, 13 cases fall into 9 truth table rows, the remaining 7 rows are logical remainders. After including only those cases when the outcome (PSI) is present (raw consistency = 1), the "standard analysis" (Ragin, 2008 ) is performed, limiting my interpretation to the so-called "intermediate solution" (Schneider and Wagemann, remainders that comply with the directional expectations on the single conditions, the latter need to be set before proceeding further with the analysis. Thus, and on the basis of the theoretical consideration explained earlier in this article, a condition is expected to contribute to PSI when: WEALTH -PCON -CCUM -PFUND.
Taking all this setup into consideration, and after the information displayed in the truth According to the formula displayed above, and bearing in mind that poor economic development is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for weak systemic institutionalization, it seems clear that party systems will always be institutionalized in rich countries. This is not to say that party systems in poor countries are condemned to be under-institutionalized. On the contrary, PSI will take place in poor countries provided that, together with a low number of parliamentary parties, they make available public funding for political parties or cleavages structure in a cumulative way.
Conditions for psi
Using the same conditions as before, but bearing in mind that causation is not essentially symmetric, I proceed now to analyze why some party systems have remained under-institutionalized during the period here examined.
Interestingly enough, the analysis of necessity reveals that poor economic development (wealth), with a consistency score of 1, is a necessary condition for weak systemic institutionalization. This has important implications for the sufficiency analysis below as I will need to block any logical remainder displaying the presence of the condition (WEALTH). This finding does not come, however, as a surprise. In fact, taking into consideration the literature on the topic as well as bearing in mind the "causal mechanism" explained above, the economy is the only condition producing both a closer (i.e. on the demand side) and short-term effects on the electorate.
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As far as the analysis of sufficiency is concerned, and after imposing a frequency threshold of one and a raw consistency threshold of 0.8, I specify the following directional expectations: wealth-pcon-ccum-pfund. This yields an intermediate solution term consisting again of three paths containing the necessary condition wealth (table 3) . Similarly to the solution term for the outcome, the relatively low unique coverage values of all three paths signal that they empirically overlap. Thus, both the Estonian and Lithuanian party systems display weak levels of systemic institutionalization for different reasons. Although there are four uniquely covered cases (i.e. Poland, Serbia, Latvia and Bulgaria), both the consistency and coverage of the overall solution term is 1.
Leaving aside the fact that party systems in rich countries will never suffer from weak levels of institutionalization, it seems clear that the combination of two of any of the other three conditions (i.e. pcon, ccum and pfund) will be enough to hinder the process of systemic institutionalization.
important "causal model" explaining the process of PSI in post-communist Europe.
This is not to say that PSI cannot take place in poor (wealth*pfund) countries (e.g.
Ukraine), provided they have an adequate socio-institutional configuration (PCON*CCUM). However, if the latter is not true -i.e. only one of these two conditions is present -then their fate is totally sealed.
Conclusions
Since Mainwaring and Scully (1995) From a methodological point of view, this article not only confirms the general benefits of using MMR, but more specifically, and clearly attuned with other articles of this special issue (Beach and Rohlfing; Schneider and Rohlfing; Beach) the complementarity of both "configurational" and case-study techniques. Indeed, and adequately combined, condition-/mechanism-centered MMR designs can provide scholars with more (even if different) information than the most sophisticated quantitative analysis. Thus, while the MSDO/MDSO procedure has reduced complexity by reducing the number of possible explanatory conditions from a total of seventeen to just four, the combination of both congruence and PT has allowed me to understand the specific causal mechanisms linking each of the conditions to the outcome both at specific moments and over time, respectively. Once it was clearthanks to the use of PT -that all causal conditions were neither always present (or absent) nor directly linked, a fully confirmatory csQCA, using Schneider and
Rohlfing's (in this special issue) terminology, enabled me to know the manner in which they combined for specific post-communist countries.
From a substantive perspective, the main conclusion is the following: at least until 2010, party systems in economically developed nations institutionalized to a higher degree than in economically backward countries. This is not to say, however, that poor countries could not institutionalize, as the examples of both Romania and Ukraine clearly show. However, this certainly required further efforts, that is, (1) a low number of legislative parties, and (2) a system of public funding or a cumulative cleavage structure.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the article seems to imply, similarly to what can be found in the democratic consolidation literature (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) , the existence of a certain threshold of wealth, suggesting that during the first two decades the institutionalization in post-communist party systems was, if not only, mostly a question of money.
Although it is perhaps too early to form any definitive conclusions, as the most recent electoral results in Hungary, Slovenia or the Czech Republic show, pointing as they do to a certain process of de-institutionalization (Haughton and Kraovec, 2013; Stegmaier and Linek, 2014; Deegan-Krause and Haughton, forthcoming) , what my findings do definitively show is the necessity to build a bridge between those scholars who exclusively emphasize either sociological or institutional dependence. Indeed, and in a similar vein to what all the contributions in this special issue suggest in terms of methodology, complementarity of different explanatory approaches constitutes the only way forward for any revision of the judgements made here.
